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INTRODUCTION
My conference today is inspired by a « grand cours » I
had been asked to teach at Sciences Po, Paris, by the Premier
President of the Court of Cassation (then Guy Canivet – he has
since been promoted to the Conseil constitutionnel). This class
was the first in a serie on the theme of « Justice in a global
world ». The Premier President had asked me to present the
judicial systems in the world – not the classical « legal » systems
in the world, as I was used to. The challenge proved interesting,
since it led me to compare the world’s legal systems through the
« judicial lense », so to speak. So what I would like to do today
is share this new outlook with you. I admit that to present the
different judicial systems in the world in 45 minutes is quite a
challenge, but I managed it at Sciences Po so it should be ok
today as well. The way I tackled the time problem was simply to
focus on examples inserted in a wider outline rather than pretend
(and fail) to be exhaustive. Therefore, I propose to paint a portrait
of the judge like an impressionist artist would, thus using different
judicial figures, or models, chosen through time and space. I
apologize for interpreting a written paper rather than improvising
outloud, but once again, I was concerned about the time limit
and was afraid to stray!
The judge is to law what the judicial systems are to legal
systems: it would be very hard to talk about one without talking
about the other. You probably know the traditional classification
of the leading legal systems in the world, that the world map
designed by the Civil law section of the University of Ottawa
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echoes. The common law systems include English law and the
national legal systems related to it by way of conquest (Australia,
New Zealand, the United States, etc.). The romanist systems
(thus called because they are the inheritors of the Roman law
spirit) – they are also called in English « civil law systems » -
stem from the French and German traditions, respectively
embedded in the French civil code and B.G.B., exported by
conquest, borrowing of imitation. Besides those two leading
systems (common law and civil law), comparatists also identify
customary systems (or unwritten systems) and systems inspired
by a religion – the so-called « religious systems » (like islamic
law, jewish/talmudic law, hindu law) None of these four types of
systems is mutually exclusive, and that’s what explains the
development of « mixed » systems, where the characteristics
of two or several of the four systems blend into an often unique
cocktail.
As promised, I will thus talk about those legal systems in
the world under a very specific angle : the judicial angle, more
precisely through the two missions generally given to judges in
time and space – say the law and decide cases. Therefore, I will
turn first to the relation uniting the judge to the legal rule he
utters, interprete or apply (« Judges and the law »), and then
to the modes of conflict resolution administered by judges
(« Judges and conflicts »).
1 JUDGES AND THE LAW: BETWEEN
INTERPRETATION AND CREATION OF THE
RULE
What is the nature of the relation between the judge and
the legal rule – legal rule which, once applied, should lead to
the judicial resolution of the conflict (the case)? There is no
simple, plain answer to this complex question; rather, the answer
takes the form of a polyphony reflecting the variety of the legal
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systems where all theses judges interact with legal rules everyday.
Between the judges-interpreters who receive the legal norm from
outside and the judges-legislators who create it from inside, other
judges resemble the Roman god Janus because of the two faces
their mixed legal tradition impose on them. I will evoke them
in this order in connection with their respective legal tradition.
1.1 Judges-interpretors: Law from outside
1.1.1 Romanistes judges
Civil  law judges are what I  cal l  here « judges-
interpreters » because they are not, officially at any rate,
considered as lawmakers. In France for instance, the new
hierachy of legal sources imposed after the 1789 revolution
implied the subordination of jurisprudence to statutory law. The
excesses of the Parliaments d’ancien régime had led to a reaction
in the new order, a « legicentrism » where judges should only
have been, to quote Montesquieu, « the mouth saying the words
of the law, a soulless being that can not temper its force or
power ». In practice of course, the « souless beings » were quick
to recover and fight back. It is true that the anathema thrown
on « judge-made law » explains the official discourse that the
courts use in their formal argumentation – what an American
comparatist, Mitchell Lasser, calls their « official portrait ». This
official portrait limits the judicial role to the application of the
legislative rule and stresses the need for judicial deference towards
the legislator – legislator which in no case can be challenged or
worse, replaced. But French judges are not mere « slaves of the
legislative law » (those are the words of a 1791 circular, this
time). Thanks to the obligation they have to avoid any denial
or want of justice (they can not « refuse to judge pretexting the
opacity of the law »), they were able to renew their interpretive
power to the point of creating their own rules in the shadow of
the statutory norms they have the duty to apply. This « officious
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portrait » of the judges, next to their « official » one, explains
the ambivalent status of the jurisprudence as a legal source in
the French system and in the systems inspired by it. It also enables
us to understand better the relation between the judge and the
legislative rule he has to apply: his « power margin », or « power
space », can only open if he uses his creativeness through
interpretating the statutory norm – it does not flow from the
explicit creation of a distinct legal norm he would be allowed to
shape.
1.1.2 Islamic judges
Islamic judges – and this is my second example because, I
say this again, this conference does not pretend to be exhaustive
– can also be considered as « judges-interpreters » in their
relation to the legal norm they apply. Islamic law balances, as
my colleague Muriel Paradelle aptly puts it, « between a revealed
word and a constructed norm ». It is composed of a body of
norms of divine origin (the sharî’a contained in the Coran and
the Sunna) and of another body of doctrinal norms (the fiqh)
mostly framed outside the judge, and whose very nature is not
limited to the legal field but also pertains to the religious, social,
moral fields. When facing the sharî’a, judges are like interpreters
who remind us of the Roman jurisprudents specializing in the
study of the sacred texts. But the « pure » islamic systems are
rare – meaning systems where the sharî’a does not coexist with a
national, state law of course inspired by the islamic legal culture,
but expressed in the forms of occidental law (this is called the
qânûn, a denomination which dates back to the Ottoman period,
under the Turkish kalifat). The occidental law available for
exportation will usually be the civil law system, not the common
law (which is only exported through conquest as far as private
law goes – I am not talking here of the constitutional law of
« common law » countries such as the U.S.). Therefore, a judge
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working in such a mixed civil law-islamic law system will still
end up with a legal norm created outside him. I will go back to
this type of mixed system after having said a word of the exact
opposite of the judge-interpreter : the judge-legislator.
1.2 Judges-legislators: Law from inside
The judge-legislator, or judge-nomothetos by adaptation
of the Platonician vocabulary, voices his own law within his
court. Such judicial norms may or may not be in competition
with legislative norms – in any case, their legal status is not in
question: they are a legal source and that’s precisely what
distinguishes them from civil law « jurisprudence ». As an
illustration of the link uniting those judges-legislators to the rules
they create, I will tell you briefly about customary law judges
and common law judges.
1.2.1 Customary judges
Customary courts were very common in the pre-
revolutionary French legal landscape as well as in other European
systems in the middle ages, but current « customary » systems
are a lot rarer. The map established by the University of Ottawa
only mentions a few of them, among which figure Andorre and
the British Channel Islands (Jersey and Guernesey – where
Victor Hugo stayed for a while). The Channel Islands, for
instance, are « attached » personally to the English queen in
her quality of duchess of Normandy but Norman custom still
prevails there. It is still applied instead of the common law – at
least in those matters where no English statute was passed saying
specifically that it will apply in Jersey or Guernesey. It can thus
be said, with all the precautions warranted by the scarcity of the
available documentation, that judges still apply customary law
in Jersey and Guernesey. But if this is really the case, do they
apply norms created outside themselves (through the repetition
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD JUDICIAL PORTRAITS... 387
of certain habits over a certain period of time – hence the name
« custom », for something which is « customary ») or do they
just repeat and refine a judicial rule through a continuing stream
of decided cases? This is the very heart of the debate relating to
the nature of customary law. I hope that the description that I
am about to make of the relation between the English judges
and the common law will help clarify it somewhat.
1.2.2 Common law judges
The nature of the common law and, in general, of any so-
called « customary » law, can be better understood through its
old and intricate history. I don’t feel it is an exageration to say
that it is very difficult to understand the link between the
common law and the judges without a historical explanation.
a. The common law as the general custom of the kingdom
of England
As soon as 1100, the English kings have sworn to respect
the «lagas et consuetudines» (laws and customs) of the kingdom
of England on the occasion of their coronation (Elizabeth II did
swear an oath to the same effect at her coronation in 1953:
“Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the Peoples of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Canada (…) according to their respective laws and customs?”).
But what are those « laws and customs » of England that the
king or queen swear to respect? According to Professor Robert
Jacob, research director at the National Center for Scientific
Research (C.N.R.S.) in Paris, the laws and customs referred to
in the coronation oath were originally made of the norms applied
before the Norman invasion in 1066, thus essentially Saxon laws
and customs. The fact that the first Norman kings (Willian the
1st and his successors) promised to respect them was supposed
to help improve their political legitimacy after the conquest.
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But today, those «lages et consuetudines» of the kingdom of Great
Britain or Canada refer to the common law (here meaning a
general custom of the realm) such as it has been uttered and
refined by the royal judges whose mission it was to voice it.
Therefore, the relation of those judges to the common law
depends on the way their mission is understood. The first way
to view it is as a mission to say the pre-existing custom (common
law) that is waiting outside them to be expressed and put into
words – a little bit like the German volksgeist put forward by
Savigny in 1814. This way to understand the judges’ mission
regarding the common law is called the declaratory or
« oraculary » theory formulated for instance by Blackstone.
According to this theory, judges are seen as the « oracles » of
the general custom of the realm (like the Pythie was the oracle
of Apollo in the Greek mythology). This is a first way to
understand the mission of the judges in relation to the common
law. But there is another. It could also be argued that the mission
of the judges is to create this general custom ex nihilo, out of
nothing, because they have been granted a normative power of
their own, a normative power different from the one enjoyed by
the parliament. This is called the institutional theory of the
common law. It has more or less replaced the declaratory theory
among Canadian and English authors. But which theory is
favored by the judges? Actually, they appear to be divided. Some
intuitively adhere to the first one, some to the second one. This
lack of uniformity is understandable, because those two theories
relating to the nature of the common law (the declaratory one
and the institutional one) are not at all incompatible. The
common law can be seen as nesting in the words of individual
judgments as well as (at the same time) in the legal knowledge
common to legal professionals: this is the theory called « the
two bodies of the (common) law » that was proposed by the
legal historian Brian Simpson.
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b. The common law as a legal norm competing with
Parliament-made legislation
In any case, the coronation oath sets up a triangular
relationship where the judge enjoys a priviledged tie with the
customary norm (the common law), but where the king himself
(and its legislative successor, the parliament) is placed in a
submissive position. So it is no wonder that the development of
the common law went hand in hand with a strong judicial
« protectionism » towards it. It was to be expected, just as it
was only to be expected that judges would view the common
law as a « benefit » of the people, who can not be deprived of
it despite all the explicit legislative will to the contrary. And it
is understandable also that judges always feel free to interpret
statutes restrictively when they limit or amend the common law.
English judges, as well as Canadian, Autralian or American
courts, are the creators of their own set of rules : the common
law, which in turn compete with the legislative norm. We find
ourselves far away, here, from the civil law model where
jurisprudence is not formally a legal source, and where judicial
creativity can only make itself felt under the guise of
interpretation.
1.3 Judges-Janus: The double face of mixity
So what happens when those different systems mix? When
common law and civil law mingle in a « mixed » system, or
when civil law and islamic law are brought together? As an
illustration, and before moving to the second part of my
presentation, I will tell you about the Quebec judge (as an
example of the mixity involving common law and civil law)
and about the Egyptian judge (for the mixity civil law/islamic
law).
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1.3.1 Civil law and common law: The Québec example
(precedent v. jurisprudence)
The Quebec judge, in the first place, belongs to a mixed
system where private law flows from the romanistic tradition.
The new Quebec Civil Code (which came into force in 1994)
renewed the older Civil code of Lower Canada – the latter,
adopted in 1866, received the French civil tradition through an
open « borrowing » operation. But if the private law is indebted
to French and Roman law, Québec public law is mostly common
law by its content and methodology. This public law is more or
less uniform everywhere in Canada, thanks to the uniformizing
influence of the Supreme Court (the Supreme Court occupies
the higher place in the federal judicial hierarchy). In this context,
Quebec judges have to use two distinct legal methodologies on
a daily basis: the civil law methodology in the private sphere,
and the common law methodology in the public sphere. The
problem connected to this mixity comes from the fact that the
relation judges entertain with the judicial norm is not the same
in civil law and common law systems. In the civil law
methodology jurisprudence is not formally considered as a legal
source, but the common law is law and must be applied if possible
to new similar cases according to a subtil mecanism called the
stare decisis doctrine (or doctrine of the « precedent »). This
mecanism explains how to extract the legal reason (ratio
decidendi) from decided cases (the so-called « precedents ») in
order to apply it to the case to be decided today. In short, what
we have here are two distinct methodologies and two opposite
judicial attitudes concerning past decicions. Ideally, Quebec
judges should respect one or the other according to the legal
sphere he has to decide in. If they have to adjudicate a civil
action, they should refer to the codes and statues only rather
than to the jurisprudence. But if they have to decide a public
law question, they should apply both the common law and
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statutory law. This is « in theory ». In practice, the stare decisis
doctrine (the precedent seen as a legal source, a legal norm)
tends to increase its hold on Quebec courts, even in civil law
cases. The reasons behind this methodological shift are many,
ranging from the influence exerted by the Supreme Court of
Canada (where judges apply the stare decisis in civil law actions
originating from Quebec) to the understandable temptation for
the judges to increase their law-making powers – and through
it, their influence and power. At the end of the day though, the
result of the mixity of Quebec law implies a mutation in the
relation between Quebec judges and the judicial norm (the
jurisprudence), as well as in the relation between those judges
and the legislative norm. They move away from the romanist,
civil law tradition and get closer to the common law tradition –
from judges-interpretes, they become more « judges-legislators ».
1.3.2 Civil law and islamic law: The Egyptian example
(the principle of legality of offenses and sentences
v. uncodified islamic law)
I come now to the example taken from the Egyptian mixity.
In the Egyptian system, islamic law is mixed with a statutory law
(called qûrûn) inspired by the civil law tradition and organised
around codes – a civil code, a criminal code, etc.  The romanist
appearance of this codified system, even though it is inspired by
the islamic legal culture, might lead the foreign, western-trained
jurist to think that he moves into a familiar territory. He might
also expect Egyptian judges to abide by state law as any civil law
judge would. In fact, such an appearance would be very
misleading. To illustrate this, I will draw an example from a famous
criminal affair, the affair Abu Zayd (example which was provided
very helpfully by my colleague Muriel Paradelle, because I am
not a specialist of islamic law myself). In this notorious affair
which took place in the early 90’s, a philosophy professor had
been accused of apostasy because of his writings (he had
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advocated more rights for women, among other things). Apostasy
is, for those who do not know (and I confess I was among them)
a major crime, springing from the « denial » or rejection of a
religion deemed perfect : Islam. Anyone can then kill the apostat
– the criminal – on sight. This is also what happened, if you
remember, to the English writer Salman Rushdie after his book
« The Satanic verses ». The interesting point there, from a
comparative legal standpoint, was that if apostasy is one of the
major crimes in islamic law, it is not an offense in the Egyptian
criminal law – the one encased in the criminal code written in
the Western tradition. This code did not list apostasy among
the criminal offenses. So the criminal code was silent, and this
silence translated into a legal impossibility to condemn somebody
for such a behavior according to the principle of « legality » of
offenses and sentences (this principles means that if the offense
is not listed in the criminal code as a known infraction, one can
not be punished for it). But despite all this, the professor was
condemned by application of the islamic law. The example is
interesting because it shows an unexpected alteration in the
behaviour of the Egyptian judge towards the applicable legal
norm. Faced with one of the major crimes recognized by islamic
law, this judge that we thought would behave as a civil law judge
when dealing with state law (the criminal code) does not
hesitate to put it aside to give precedence to a legal system
supposed to be inapplicable to the case. This judge thus remains
a judge-interpreter according to my tentative qualifications, but
he does enjoy the unexpected aptitude to bring outer legal norms
in a judicial field that was thought to be closed to them.
Thus, the gradation in the relation between the judge and
the legal norm – from the judge-interpreter to the judge-legislator
– holds many grey zones according to the mixity of the legal
systems. This will stand as the conclusion to the first part of my
conference.
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2  Judges and conflicts: Between arbitration and
authoritative resolution
Now for the second one: what about the institutional and
procedural structure where this relation (between judges and
legal norms) unfolds? Does the judge act in it as an arbitrator, or
as an authoritative figure whose decisions necessarily bind the
parties? Those questions will be at the core of the second part of
my conference (entitled, as you may read, « the judge and the
conflict »). I will deal first with procedural logics, then with
the repartition of the different types of litigation between the
courts and finally, with the image of judges.
2.1 Procedural logics: A progressive scale
The procedural logic underlying the practical work of the
courts vary considerably through time and space. Historically
anyway, proceedings have shaped the body of material,
substantive rules: the former generally precede the formation of
the latter (when there is no system of substantive law to borrow
as a package from abroad – I am talking about the past, not the
present). The practical ways designed to solve conflicts – thus,
the proceedings – often represent a preliminary preoccupation
in a society seeking to organize itself: even before saying what
the rule of law is, judges are expected to say who should win the
case – with or without substantive rules to support their decision.
Thus for instance, middle-age ordeals did not rely upon any
substantive norm to decide if a criminal accusation was true or
not. After a trial by fire or water (or by the cross, etc. – in ordeals
by fire: you had to be burned by a red-hot iron and then a priest
would check how it healed; ordeal by water: you were thrown
in a pond or lake and the priest would watch how the water
« received » you – better not to get upset and rather sink
peacefully…), God spoke through the priests watching over the
performance of the ordeal and thus indicated to the judge what
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the good and true judgment was. In the same way, in the medieval
common law, juries which gave their verdict on the issue put to
them proceeded as they wished – they were hidden by the secrecy
of the deliberation anyway. These two historical illustrations
show that proceedings are crucial as to the actual solving of cases
– saying who wins and who loses. What is more, proceedings do
not necessarily imply the application of precise legal rules: the
agreeable solution (the « ok » solution for the judges, the parties
and especially the loser and his friends!) matters more than the
predictability of legal norms. This is frequently the case in
customary systems. But the parties’ agreement to the judicial
solution (and especially the agreement of the losing party) can
also flow from the strict application of pre-established procedural
norms: this is the system in place in so-called « developped »
systems, such as civil and common law systems. I shall say a word
of the procedural culture of the customary systems before evoking
the one in force in civil and common law systems.
2.1.1 Judges-arbitrators: Conciliatory proceedings in
customary law
So let us first consider the customary systems, where the
culture of the negociated solution generally prevails. I will take
three examples among them, that I shall analyze in connection
with the corresponding legal culture: first the customary tribunals
in southern Egypt, then the Shotei proceedings in Japan and
finally the practice of the ordeal in Togo.
a . The Egyptian Maglis Al-‘Urfî
The Egyptian Maglis Al-‘Urfî, in southern Egypt, will allow
us to take the pulse of a « classic » customary court (and I confess
immediately that I borrow this example from the research field
trip of my colleague Muriel Paradelle there). Those customary
tribunals sit in the southern agricultural communities, where the
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social and family ties are very tight. They try to solve the smaller
conflicts which by their very nature would endanger the social
harmony; the sentence is therefore secondary compared to the
necessity to restore this social harmony. Judges are important
people of the locality (according to the social scale). The records
are anonymous and the parties are never named. The decisions
of the tribunal tend first and foremost to a certain result (the
restoration of the social cohesion) rather than to the absolute
respect of certain proceedings or rules of substantive customary
law. They require the appobation of the two opposing parties to
become effective. Thus, the Egyptian Maglis Al-‘Urfî are rather
a negociation forum where proceedings and substative law are
note very important.
b. The Japanese Tchotei
As a second illustration of customary proceedings, the
Japanese system is interesting because of its mixed nature. Private
law has been codified according – mostly – to the German model
(the B.G.B.) but public and constitutional law are rather
American in inspiration; the rest is stil of a customary nature.
When viewed from a closer perspective, especially in the private
law sphere, the Japanese legal landscape looks like a fake
Hollywood set: beyond a civil-like façade defined by the codes,
you can see a customary horizon line occupied by traditional
rules of conduct, called the giris. There is a giri for each social
relation and corresponding situation; this giri says what each
party should do and not do. There is a giri for the relation
between the father and the oldest son, a giri for the relation
between the husband and the wife, a giri for the employer and
the employee, etc. – always in the sense of a relation between
an inferior and a superior on the social scale (the older is superior
to the younger, the man to the woman, etc.). The enduring
prevailence of the giris in Japan goes hand in hand with a deep
mistrust towards what the Westerners call « law » - this law
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which is implemented by the Japanese courts according to the
codes inspired by the civil law tradition. This mistrust implies,
for instance, that it is considered « shameful » to go to court to
vindicate a personal « right » (I only speak here, of course, about
private law – not about criminal or public law) – all the more so
because the very idea of « losing face » (through losing one’s
case) sounds terrible for an oriental (Japanese, Chinese, Corean
– this displeasure is shared in all Asia). In such a particular
context, it is easy to understand why much of the civil litigation
in Japan is still conducted outside the courts – thus, for instance,
only five per cent of divorces are pronounced at the end of judicial
proceedings). But it is interesting also to see how judicial
proceedings themselves are easily tuned to the consensual spirit
of the giris. This is what happens with the Tchotei procedure. I
heard about it through Professor Jacques Herbots (from the KU
Leuven in Belgium) when he was invited in Ottawa. Professor
Herbots had taken a sabbatical year leave in Japan and had the
opportunity to visit some tribunals and courts there. One day,
he had the surprise to discover, while walking down a corridor, a
rond room with a round table where the judge was sitting with
the parties and their lawyers. When he asked, he was told that
this was a Tchotei procedure, a sort of arbitation procedure
conducted by the judge, within the occidental-type judicial
organisation, in the presence of the parties and their lawyers.
Such arbitation proceedings are certainly not unknown in
Western civil law and common law countries (I think for
example of the judicial concilation program implemented by the
judge Otis at the Québec Appeal Court). But they do not have
the same background. In the Western judicial culture, those
arbitration proceedings try and promote the arbitration culture
thanks to the prestige and authority of the judge conducting
the negociation. But in Japan, the Tchotei proceeding echoes
the consensual spirit of the customary system founded on the
giris.
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c. The ordeal in Kabiye country (Togo)
Finally, an occurrence of an ordeal in the Kabiye country
was recorded in a remarkable cinematographical document by
French anthropologist Raymond Verdier in Togo. As I evoked it
earlier (by fire, water, etc.), the ordeal sounds very medieval and
outdated – could an ordeal take place today? Actually it could;
some occurrences can still be observed in certain customary
systems. In Raymond Verdier’s documentary, the dispute to be
adjudicated opposes two co-wives, the plaintiff acusing the
defendant to be a witch (a serious accusation in this community).
The truth of the matter, known to most members of the
community, is that the plaintiff is a notorious quarrel-seeker and
is jealous of the defendant – so she is seeking to ruin her through
the sorcery accusation. But since this accusation is serious, it is
has to be proved true or false and adjudicated: this will be done
through a fire ordeal. The main (and longest) part of the movie
and of the judicial proceedings concern the preparation of this
« judgement of god », god who is called upon to give his verdict
by granting to one of the parties the power to triumph of the
ordeal. To succeed in the ordeal here, the winning party has to
grab a ring placed at the bottom of a caldron filled with boiling
oil. As a matter of fact, the « important men » of the village
(so, the judges) cut small wood with application during a good
half an hour and discuss as much, while psychological tension
grows for the parties. When this tension is at its peak, the plaintiff
is asked to submit to the ordeal and try grabbing the ring – but
she desists, and the defendant then try and succeed. The truth
of the matter, again, is that the defendant had previously (and
secretly) received a protective cream from the « judges » of the
ordeal. Therefore, we see that the ordeal is not closed to trickery
(it was also the case in the middle-ages, with the complicity of
the priests), but at least, the social concord is restored. Publicly
defeated by a « judgment of god », the plaintiff has to drop her
accusation and social harmony is restored (at least for a time…).
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So, the « negociation » associated with this mode of conflict
solving can be more or less « forced » by the pressure of the
group on the parties, thanks to a proceeding (the ordeal)
organized according to a set of rather strict rules. Therefore, we
are not that far, despite the rather exotic character of this conflict-
solving mode, from the strict and pre-established proceedings
in civil and common law systems that I am going to compare
now.
2.1.2 Judges-spectators & Judges-actors: Accusatory and
Inquisitorial proceedings in common and civil law
Judges-spectators or judges-actors, civil and common law
judges evolve within two antagonistic types of proceedings: the
accusatorial model for the common law and the inquisitorial
model for the civil law. Historically, the source of this dualism
(which is particularly strong in criminal matters) is linked to
the disparition of the ordeal in France and England following
the fourth concile of Latran in 1215. How could private disputes
be solved without the ordeal? And how could judges possibily
determine if the accused person is guilty or not witouth it?
England and France came up with two very different procedural
solutions. England turned to the jury and France towards the
inquisitorial model inspired by Roman and canon law. But as a
consequence, their two procedural systems have diverged greatly
from then on because the role imparted to the judge in each is
very different. In England, the intervention of the jury assigns a
« secondary » part to the judge: he is more a spectator than a
player. On the contrary, in France, the Roman-canonical model
implies that the judge is a very active player during the whole
length of the trial. This general trend is still very much alive in
civil and common law systems. The common law judge tends to
be more of a referee (in the sense of a football referee, not a
legal arbitrator): he has to keep the score and let the parties and
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their lawyers play the game. By contrast, the civil law judge
participates more actively in the proceedings: he conducts them,
chooses the experts, asks for this or that evidence, etc. In the
criminal sphere, the distinction between the inquisitorial and
accusatorial proceedings cristallizes in the opposition of specific
rules and practices. This is the legal area where the distinction
matters the most, particularly when an international criminal
court has to be created (like the one in La Haye): one model
needs to be chosen over the other, or a new one should be created
in mixing the characteristics of both accusatorial and inquisitorial
proceedings. Just to give you an idea of the technical
ramifications of this duality, here are some of their characteristics.
The accusatorial model implies that the witnesses are questioned
in court by the lawyers, where the inquisitorial model makes
this the task of the juge d’instruction out of court (juge d’instruction
that has no equivalent in the accusatorial model). Concerning
the weigth of the evidence, the accusatorial trend insists on the
importance of evidence obtained in court (especially through
witnesses), but the inquisitorial trend rather favours written
evidence and in general, evidence obtained out of court.
Paradoxically, the accusatorial model is more familiar for the
public in general, including the French one, than the inquisitorial
procedure that prevails in French law – this is the direct
consequence of the diffusion of the American legal culture
through many T.V. series. I won’t say more about this because I
am not a specialist of criminal law (rather a private and civil law
one). So I would like to end my presentation of the procedural
logics by talking briefly about the occasional failures of the
Western model, especially on the civil law side: what I call, in
my outline, the « half-judge ».
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2.1.3 Half-judges: Effectivity problems in civil law
systems
Modes of conflict solving – procedural rules – should not
stop abruptly at the lecture of the judgment. They also have to
guarantee the effective application of the judicial decision – if
not, they are lose half their meaning. This problem is more potent
in civil law systems because more emphasis is placed on the first
aspect of the judicial mission (to say the law) than on the second
one (solve conflicts). Talking about the symbolic attributes of
justice (the scales and the sword), Pierre Drai thus remarked
that « the evolution, in time, was that the scales became more
important than the sword: the judicial science, in the formulation
and application of the legal rule, took over on his power to
command and impose ». Take for instance the rule protecting
public property from demolition in application of a judgment:
even if a military casern encroach on a private property, the
encroachment can not be suppressed and the private owner has
to satisfy himself with damages – money. But what is odd is that
in Belgium or France, the judgment itself will formally order the
demolition: it just won’t be possible to execute it. By contrast,
in common law systems, the application of a judgment is as
important as the judgment itself. Through the judgment and its
application, it is the whole image and credibility of the courts
that is at stake: the application is never taken lightly. Thus, for
instance, a party that refuses to comply with an injunction (a
judicial order to do or not to do something) will be guilty of
contempt of court and can be sentenced to a fine, or even to a
prison time (including in civil matters). But in the example I
used for Belgium and France (the public property can never be
demolished as a sanction), it also means that the injunction in
demolition will simply not be pronounced. To do otherwise
(grant the injunction in demolition in the judgment and then
leave it unexecuted) would undermine the authority of the
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common law judicial system. Therefore, common law judges are
more aware than their civilian counterparts that the sword is as
important as the scales. To avoid being half-judges, they concern
themselves – to a certain extent of course! – with the execution
and effectiveness of their decisions.
But I have said enough about procedural logics and, even
if I have to restrain myself because this is such an interesting
topic, I will now say a few things about the allocation of the
cases between the courts.
2.2 The allocation of conflicts: A divisible competence
This question, fortunately, is easy to summarize briefly. Civil
law systems (at least the ones I know in Europe) are
characterized, generally, by a principle of specialisation of the
judicial institutions. Common law systems, on the contrary,
usually present a greater centralization of the judicial
competences and missions in the hands of fewer courts. This
duality is once again historical in origin, but I will not dwell
upon it. I will just present the two opposite principles (of
specialisation and centralisation) briefly in turn.
2.2.1 The specialisation principle
The French system, that I will take as an illustration of
the civil law trend, is characterized by the explosion of the
different areas of competence between several specialised courts.
There are commercial courts and work courts (the Prud’hommes)
operating beside the « general » courts systems like the
tribunaux d’instance et de grande instance; other courts specialise
in administrative law (administrative courts topped by the
Consei l  d’état) and in constitutional law (the Consei l
constitutionnel).  Such a specialisation of course leads to problems
of attribution – should this case go to this court or that one?
Reality is rarely amenable to legal categories. Specialisation also
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brings, of course, dissenting opinions about the content of the
law on certain subjects – the Conseil d’état may, for instance,
entertain a different opinion on the extent of the protection of
the right of ownership than the one advocated by the Court of
cassation.
2.2.2 The centralisation principle
By contrast, in England, the common law system is
organized around the centralised competence of a few courts in
London: the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords. There are no other equivalent-ranking courts endowed
with specialized attributions. The « common » courts are
entitled to adjudicate any type of conflicts: civil ones, criminal
ones, commercial, work-related, administrative, constitutional
ones,… This centralisation has the advantage of preventing
conflicts between the specialised courts like in France, and
increases of course the uniformity of the legal rules applied. It is
true that administrative tribunals can be found in England, but
those are not real courts of justice and their work is supervised
by the main courts in London – this is because, remember, the
common law is the benefit of every subject and they can not be
deprived of this benefit, etc.: the English judges are the guardians
or trustees of the common law.
In Canada or in the United States, the judicial organisation
is similar, except that the federal structure of the country gives
the Supreme Court (which is the equivalent of the English
House of Lords) of an additional constitutional competence that
allows its judges to decide the conflicts between the federal
institutions and the states (in the US) or provinces (in Canada).
After those precisions concerning the repartition of the
judicial competences, centralised in common law and specialised
in civil law systems, I will now embark on the last section of my
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conference, devoted to the image of the judge. I will present it
in the form of a comparative conclusion.
2.3 Figures of judges: An expandable status
The image of the judge vary considerably in the different
systems we talked about today, and also within each of those
systems.
2.3.1 Judges-administrators
Some judges are so only by name when they amount to
nothing more, from a practical point of view, than to anonymous
automatons in the application of the law – like administrative
agents. This the case, for instance, of County Courts judges in
England. Even though those judges decide 95 percent of civil
cases at trial level, they are only viewed as the « menial
workers » of the common law. Their decisions are not published
in law reports, because they are implicitly considered as forming
an « inferior » class in the English judiciary. They only apply
the common law – they do not create it. This creative priviledge
belongs to the central courts in London : the High Court, the
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The only « plus » of
the County courts judges is that they are professional judges,
where other « judges-administrators » in England are not (like
those sitting in the administrative tribunals, like the magistrates
who decide criminal cases at trial level, etc.).
2.3.2 Judges-associates
French judges fare better than those poor « judges-
administrators ». They are considered by the legislator as its
« associates » in the application of the law. Portalis, the
« mother » of the French civil code (the father being Napoleon
in this view), already called upon them in his famous « prelimary
discourse » to the code when he wrote that : « we have been
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struck by the opinion, so widely entertained, that in the
redaction of a civil code, a few precise articles on every subject
would be enough, and that the supreme legislative art is to
simplify all while providing for everything. ‘Simplify all’, is an
operation that should be more clearly defined. ‘Provide for
everything’ is an impossible goal. We thus refrained ourselves
from the dangerous ambition to regulate and foresee everything.
A code, as complete as it may seem, is no sooner written, that a
thousand unexpected questions present themselves to the judge.
(…) It is up to the judges and the doctrine authors, attentive to
the general spirit of the laws, to direct its application ».
Therefore, if civil law judges – as we have seen – must
officialy not act as legislators, at least their aptitude to creative
interpretation is practically unavoidable in the application of
the written law. But nevertheless, their official role (I refer here
to the image of Lasser’s double portrait) limits their status. French
judges are relatively numerous, and the principle of specialisation
(regarding the attribution of cases) weaken their margin of power
and influence. They never speak at the first person, in their
own name: the identity of each judge is absorbed in the one of
the court to which they belong – it does not matter if they decide
collegially or individually. Their dissenting opinions are
artificially muffled in an inexorable unanimity, because the court
and the law can only speak in a single voice. Even the form of
the decisions of the highest French jurisdiction in civil matters
(the Court of cassation) strenghtens this appearance of unity
and de-personalisation. But to really understand the status of
French judges, nothing speaks better than a comparison with
the status of common law judges.
2.3.3 Judges-kings
My contract law teacher at the University of Moncton
(New-Brunswick, Canada) used to tell us half-jokingly that judges
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were « little kings ». She aptly described the priviledged status
enjoyed by common law judges, in Canada as in England (and
to talk only about those because I know them better). Anglo-
Canadian judges are few – compared to the « army » of French
judges. They come from practice (they usually were preeminent
lawyers) and not from some school for judges (like the Ecole de
la magistrature in France). They enjoy a wide array of
competences in every legal area (private law, criminal law,
commercial and business law, administrative law, constitutional
law, etc.) and see themselves as the guardians or « trustees » of
the common law for the benefit of the citizens (or subjects).
The common law itself is a judge-made law competing with the
parliament-made law… and this parliament-made law is applied
by the judges anyway : they thus apply both set of rules.
Canadian judges do not stop at being law makers. They also act
as arbitrators in the power struggles between the federal state
and the provinces. In England as in Canada, the judges’
individuality expresses itself very distinctly through long
nominative decisions and through concurring and dissenting
opinions. Some would even say that the current length of the
Canadian Supreme court’s judgments allow them to fully express
their opinion on a thousand and one subjects – and not all of
them pertinent to solve the case. Finally, procedural rules such
as the sanction of the contempt of court make the prestige of
common law judges even stronger, since their orders can not be
disobeyed without a potential condemnation to a fine and/or a
prison sentence. It is hard to convey fully, to outsiders, the nature
and the extent of the prestige enjoyed by the judiciary in England
or Canada – including in Québec, since Quebec judges enjoy
the same status as their common law counterparts.
I will spare you a long « summing-up » conclusion; instead,
I will just quote the French poet André Breton: « nobody does,
when speaking, better than to submit to a possibility of mysterious
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conciliation between what he knew he had to say on a certain
subject, with what he did not know he had to say and that
nonetheless he managed to say ». I hope I was able to achieve a
little of this mysterious conciliation and I thank you very much
for you attention.
